Expert viewpoints on the Iran war

What is the immediate or short-term outlook for Iran and the U.S.?

Michael Horowitz: The U.S. and Israeli strikes on Iran reflect a deliberate escalation of the conflict, and, with President Trump calling for the destruction of Iran's capacity to resist, there will be no incentive for Iran’s new leaders to back down. The campaign is currently focused on destroying Iran’s air defenses and the missile launchers that Iran will rely on to retaliate in the short-term. Iran has already launched strikes against multiple countries in the region in response, and, if they can maintain regime cohesion, Iran’s response options include ballistic missiles, drones, and more indirect action through proxies such as Hezbollah and the Houthis.

What misconceptions about Iran’s nuclear program most hinder effective policymaking today?

Marie Harf: The biggest misconception is that there’s a way to permanently destroy Iran’s nuclear program with military strikes. You can severely damage and degrade it, as we saw when the United States and Israel bombed Iran last summer. But even after those attacks, the Iranians were able to start rebuilding fairly quickly. Once a country has the technical knowledge to enrich uranium, they can’t unlearn it. You cannot bomb all of that know-how away. Iran’s nuclear program is too big and too diffuse for any one set of military strikes to permanently destroy it. That’s one of the rationales the Trump administration is giving for the current war­, that they needed to degrade the nuclear program even further, which demonstrates the limits of singular bombing campaigns against a nuclear program with multiple sites spread throughout a large country.

What should policymakers watch for to determine whether Iran is shifting toward escalation or de-escalation?

Daniel Schneiderman: In many ways, this moment is unprecedented. That makes indicators difficult to pin down, in no small part because the escalation ladder is completely broken because of the framing of this war as being aimed at regime change. So, from the Iranian perspective, what incentive is there to de-escalate right now? Their actions make clear they intend to impose consequences on the regional partners they believe are at fault (and even those that are simply aligned with the U.S.) and want to show that they remain a force to be reckoned with. It’s not hard to imagine that the Iranians attempt to mine the Straits of Hormuz to functionally stop oil and gas tanker traffic, for instance. That would be an escalation that would draw regional partners more fulsomely into the war, which would show up through U.S. planes using bases in the region to launch airstrikes and missiles (which heretofore they have not done). 

Signs of de-escalation will come from quiet outreach by Iran to traditional third-party interlocutors like the Swiss, the Qataris, the Omanis, and the Russians in an attempt to have messages delivered to the U.S. indirectly. I do think it’s more likely the Russians play that role in the short term given the significant damage that’s been done to Gulf-Iran relationships over the last few days.

What might the future of the Iranian regime look like?

Huss Banai: I wouldn’t be surprised that, this time around, we’re going to see someone remarkably different from the last two, Khomeini and Khameini, precisely because the structure of power in Iran has become so much more entrenched along security lines. The Revolutionary Guards, for all intents and purposes, are now in charge of the country. On top of this, there’s the Iranian people. I don’t think we should underestimate a nation of 90 million people that have really risked their lives over and over again, taken to the streets, to at some point perhaps exert their voice as well.